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0. Abstract
Due to more turbulent market environments in the end of the 90’s, there seems to be a need for new ways of
organising tourism firms. In the article I explain why new organisational models are of importance. Thereafter
I introduce the business federation as a possible model to use as it seeks to be able to highlight business
paradoxes  in a good way. In order to operations  the business federation I introduce certain building blocks.
In the end of the paper I explain how it is possible to use the building blocks in tourism firms.
Published on the web 2000-07-21 by the Library, HiL.
1. Introduction
In the latter half of the 19th century, the modern business enterprise took form, quickly taking the place of
market mechanisms in coordinating economic activity (Chandler, 1977). As integrating all activities inside an
organisation became more efficient than to buy them in the marketplace, companies grew into vertically
integrated entities (Williamson, 1975). Vertically integrated hierarchies were very successful because of
simultaneous growth in customer demand provided an outlet for the mass-produced goods.
As customer tastes became more advanced, tourism companies moved toward matrix forms and network
forms. This helped companies in the attempt to integrate  different areas of business.  However, during the
first part of the 90’s, companies faced an 
acceleration in the rate of competitive changes  that effected how companies  best could compete. The
competitive landscape was reshaped by forces such as globalisation, technological change and deregulation
of service offerings. Social changes, such as more women in leading positions, also led to new ways of
organising tourism firms.
Competitive and social forces place heavy demands on tourism  companies. Managers try to couple the
advantages associated with former competitive regimes, such as scale economics resulting from resource
accumulation and control, with responses to the challenges of the new reality. Specifically, Snow, Miles and
Coleman (1992) caution that managers who want their companies to be strong competitors in the 21st
century will need to search globally for opportunities and resources, to maximise returns on the assets
dedicated to a business and to perform only those functions for which the company can develop expert skill
and outsource the rest of the activities in which the company does not have a competitive advantage. These
authors claim that the new competitive reality demands companies to be simultaneously efficient and
adaptive. Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) go a step further when they state that companies will have to
manage internally inconsistent competencies, structures and cultures,  yet with a single vision.  
Itintich, D’Aveni and Lewin (1996) warn that dominant paradigms in organisational theory based on
uncertainty avoidance and stability seeking are inadequate in the new competitive context. Several
alternative approaches have been introduced for coping with the new paradoxes such as the one of
efficiency versus adaptivenness, such as the network (Miles and Snow, 1986), the virtual corporation
(Davidow and Malone, 1992) and the horisontal organisation (Ostroff and Smith, 1992).  
Carsten M. Syvertsen: Towards the Business Federation in Tourism Firms.
Lillehammer College: Working paper no 91, 1999.
2
2. Introduction of the business federation
Handy (1992) adds that executives are facing a number of paradoxes:  1. The need to attain the advantages
of large companies as well as small ones, 2. The recognition that open and free markets are the best
guarantee of efficiency, yet personal preferences often lead managers to organise operations for centralised
control, 3, Managers’ desire to run businesses as they were wholly owned, but since they are a part of a
larger group they will have to be managed on the basis of shared interest and mutual respect.
Handy advances that the concept of federation to be particularly appropriate to deal with these
contradictions. Moreover, the author adds an additional factor that should be of great importance for service
employees. Service employees expect the company to recognise their individual talent and demand space
and autonomy to provide their contributions. Service employees feel proud of their knowledge and will not
give up too much decision making to management. 
As  companies increasingly face this new management reality, Handy argues that “the move to federation is
inevitable”. To help to understand how it is supposed to work, Handy (1992) puts forward five principles of
the federation: 
1. Subsidiary means that the power belongs to the lowest possible point in the organisation. Only with the
agreement of the lower units can upper levels exercise authority, in a sort of inverted delegation.
2. Interdependence  which implies that power and expertise are spread around to avoid the risk and pitfalls
associated with placing them in a single center. 
3. A set of basic and common rules of conduct. The federation needs mechanisms for holding the pieces
together. 
4. Separation to keep management, monitoring and governance in segregated units. Governance will
ultimately be democratic, accountable to all the stakeholder  groups on which the firm depends. 
5. Twin citizenship. Any organisational member feels like citizen of both a local unit and the federated
union. The whole draws its strengths from strong leadership and entrepreneurial activities of local units. 
3. Operating rules and basis components of the business federation with an
emphasis on the tourism industry.
Recent research has put forward a first description of the basic building blocks of the business federation
(Masifern and Masifern, 1997). Some initial empirical tests of the federation has been conducted (Masifern,
1997; Masifern et al, 1997, Vila and Syvertsen, 1998). 
In this paper I try to operationalise certain building blocks, particularly suited for the tourism industry.  Even
though operating as a business federation is a complex task (Masifern and Masifern, 1997) it is possible to
identify some design parameters which to ascertain a description of this organisational form.
 I focus on autonomy, support services, control mechanisms, ownership, and interrelationships. I do not
believe that these parameters are sufficient to give a complete picture of federalist behavior, however, they
can highlight certain patterns. I will also relate federalist behavior to performance. In this way I will try to
answer why some organisations fare better than others.
Autonomy. The business federation operates with discrete local units that have substantial authority when it
comes to satisfy local clients. Autonomy puts decision making rights in the hands of those who are closest to
the markets since it is assumed that the growing complexity and variety of local demands put service
employees in a better position than headquarters to address client issues (Asava et al, 1994).
Autonomy refers to the right employees have to make independent decisions. They expect considerable
discretion, freedom and independence in scheduling work, determining work tasks, and choosing methods. 
Service employees achieve autonomy by protecting the highly skilled nature of their work through direct
control over work tasks (Freidson, 1984). Autonomy refers to the exclusive rights employees have to
evaluate the competence of colleagues in executing activities and tasks, for example through peer reviews
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(Greenwood et al, 1990). They take advice and seek support from peers and junior experts more on an
informal basis than through formal rules. 
Service employees are goal-oriented and tend to be opportunistic about how they direct their efforts to reach
specific goals. Furthermore, they are presumed to specialise except among the newest associates who have
not yet picked a speciality. Specialisation represents a deepening of expertise and knowledge. While
specialisation may result in performing more narrowly defined tasks the depth in which the work is performed
is greater requiring a high degree of expertise (Wholey, 1985). 
Most research on autonomy focuses on the individual level of analysis, which stands in contract to the
business practices of employees working in groups. Employees share a complex division of labour, for
example reflected in tourism firms specialise in types of practices. 
There is an increased research interest for self-managed and semi-autonomous work groups. Researchers
have proposed that groups with task interdependence have a positive effect on motivation (Kiggundi, 1983;
Wong and Campion, 1991), and, in turn, on group effectiveness (Larson and Fasto, 1989; Saavendra et al.,
1993). 
Acceptance of the assumption that semi-autonomous groups need to be high on task interdependence
implicitly suggests that when groups are low on task interdependence, performance may suffer. Forcing
autonomy and decision making, when group members naturally carry out their tasks independently of one
another may lead to dysfunctional outcomes (Hackman, 1977; Pearce and Ravlin, 1987). On the other hand,
for individuals working independently and having respect each other's competence lack of autonomy at the
group level may harm performance. This is because group members may find it overly time-consuming and
ineffective to reach consensus on decisions that may be more effectively handled at the individual level.
Excessive time may be spent on co-ordination activities that members may feel are unnecessary. 
Performance. Since Berle and Means (1932) emphasised the importance of the separation of ownership
from control in the modern corporation it has been suggested that autonomy may moderate strategy-
performance relationships. I assume that autonomy has a positive effect on performance because it is in
accordance with the wishes of both the client and the professional market. 
 Local units co-ordinate activities and try to achieve synergies. In such situations local autonomy can
become secondary (Pitts and Chittipeddi, 1985). The reason for this can be that co-ordination gives greater
benefits than sub optimising at the local levels.
Theory on self-managed teams suggests that autonomy of decisions enhances intrinsic motivation of group
members, which in turn results in higher performance (Hackman, 1977: Pearce and Ravlin, 1987). Although
some support has been found for this proposition (Beekun, 1989; Cohen and Ledford, 1994; Pasmore and
Khalsa, 1983), other researchers have not found significant results, explained by structural variables not
addressed in these studies (Goodman et al, 1987; Pearce and Ravlin, 1987). 
Boosting units. A trend in the business literature on multinational firms is the recognition that certain tasks
are performed better by headquarters than the local units because greater possibilities to achieve economics
of scale (Teece, 1980). However, such tasks represent a significant piece of headquarters' cost, and should
therefore contribute significantly to the value creation (Coold et al, 1994). 
One task that can be effectively taken care of by headquarters is the creation of supply services.
Centralising supply services at corporate level can facilitate reaching a critical mass which otherwise would
not have been possible by duplicating services located at the local levels. Centralisation allows services to
be provided more cost-effectively, or functional skills to be better utilised (Goold et al, 1987).
Local units that receive support services are supposed to enhance the position in the marketplace. This is
the reason why support services are referred to as boosting units. By using boosting units innovations can
be implemented rapidly locally, more or less independent of geographic location (Davenport et al, 1997).
Boosting units can also help to co-ordinate activities between business units. Boosting units can, in turn,
enhance consistency and achieve cohesion within the firm.
Performance. I believe that there are two reasons why the use of boosting units can have a positive effect on
performance. In a world that is coming more homogeneous only headquarters will be able to achieve
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economics of scale in order to achieve critical mass. Secondly, by leaving production of boosting to
headquarters it is possible for local units to concentrate on serving local clients. 
Control mechanisms, defined as any process in which one party affect others behavior (Goold and Quinn,
1990), can be used by headquarters in order to be reasonably confident that unpleasant surprises will not
occur at local levels. Furthermore, using control mechanisms makes it more likely that local units will use
their knowledge to pursue the interests of the corporations as a whole and not just their own partial interests
(Chakravarthy and Lorange, 1990). 
Headquarters can use formal and social means of control in the relationship with local units. Whereas formal
means of control ensure predictability through the specification of how people in the organisation should
behave, social means of control utilise organisational norms and values to encourage desirable outcomes
(Child, 1984). The key difference is that when formal means control can be regarded as a strict evaluation of
performance social means of control rely more on normative considerations in order to influence behavior.
Furthermore, while formal means of control rely more on delegation without loosing control over what is
going on, the aim of social means of control is to induce desirable behavior through what members of an
organisation accept as legitimate (Child, 1984). A strong professional requirement is one example of social
control (Child, 1984). Another social control mechanism is what Ouchi (1980) called "a clan".
Social means of control consist of ideology and culture. Ideology, defined as an integrated set of beliefs that
bind individuals to the organisation and provide a shared meaning (Starbuck, 1982), means that
organisational members have the basic beliefs of how organisations work, or should work. 
Ideology can help to reduce mental uncertainty by providing meaning and understanding (Levinhagen et al.
1993). An ideology can help to "organise" uncertainties by identifying and crystallising a firm's agenda
(Simons, 1994). This leads to a common frame of reference and familiarity with common methods through
schooling, standards and vocabulary.
Culture, regarded as a subgroup of ideological means of control, are beliefs, norms, routines and values that
are collectively developed over time (Moncoulides and Heck, 1993). Culture can be defined as common
cognitive mind set so that even people who do not know each other personally will have a common
understanding, manifested in behaviors and language. Cultures are developed through a feeling of
belonging, for example that professionals believe they are equal partners in determining the future of the
company. 
The surest, although not the only basis of an ideological dominance in an organisation, is homogeneity of
participants. If many members of an organisation subscribe to a particular ideology the principles of the
ideology will fundamentally influence the organisation. 
Recruitment is one way to promote homogeneity within an organisation. The business literature suggests
that there is a tendency to select new members on the basis of similarity to those who already participate in
the organisation (Kanter, 1977). A second process that leads to homogeneity is socialisation. Even if some
participants enter an organisation without subscribing to its dominant ideology they may be influenced after
joining the organisation (Gainer, 1972). Trade journals and industry newsletters can serve as features of
socialisation. Industry events such as conferences and trade shows are reasoned to diffuse norms by setting
standards and exchanging information. 
Even when there is no homogeneity among participants it is possible for an ideology to be dominant in an
organisation. Just as complete consensus is not necessary for an organisation to set and act on a goal
(Cyert and March, 1963), complete ideological homogeneity is not necessary for an organisation to be
influenced by an ideology. Authority and power may allow professionals to make decisions in accordance
with an ideology even when significant ideological heterogeneity exists in the organisation.
Performance. I believe that social means of control can have a positive effect on performance because such
mechanisms can regulate behavior. 
This is also in accordance with research conducted by Kotter and Heskett (1992) who suggested that
companies emphasising social control mechanisms outperformed firms that did not possess such traits.
Such positive findings have usually explained by synergies within the firm. Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
stressed that the reason for the existence of the firm lies in what they call "team production". Team
production exists when the collective output from a group of individuals is greater than the sum of their
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individual output, and where it is simultaneously difficult to discover each individual's specific contribution to
the group effort. Thus, in addition to the productive potential of human capital (Becker, 1964), some form of
organisational or social capital accounts for the extra production. 
 
On the other hand, however, it is not possible to take for granted the direction of causality between control
mechanisms and de facto control (Levine and Tyson, 1990). Scholars have also suggested a number of
unintended negative consequences resulting from implementation of control mechanisms such as behavioral
displacement, gamesmanship, operating delays, and negative attitudes (Goold and Quinn, 1990), 
 
Ownership. Since Berle and Means (1932) raised the issue, ownership of resources generated in the
modern corporation has been a matter of great concern. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulated the study
of this problem under the rubric "agency costs". One proposal for reducing agency costs is for management
of the firm to hold a portion of the stock. 
The business federation suggests that a feel of ownership of resources should be a part of the incentive
system. A feel of ownership for local managers can have positive effects both on the client market and on
the talent market for employee. Demanding customers require flexible organisations with a broad range of
offerings as well as an ability to tailor-make outputs to individual needs. In many industries there is a tough
competition for the best talent, and without offering a feel of ownership companies can loose in the
professional market.
Performance. Researchers have identified a positive relationship between ownership and performance (Kim
et al. 1988; Osward and Jahera, 1991; Morch et al., 1988; and Mehran, 1992). These academics suggest
that there is a positive relationship between ownership and performance, however only for low levels of
stocks. As ownership increases managers are supposed to get entrenched because they have their capital
tied to the firm. They typically have an incentive to undergo some of the benefits of higher leverage in order
to reduce the possibilities of bankruptcy. 
However, Molz (1988), Chaganti et al. (1985), Tsetsekos and De Fusco (1990) found no statistically
significant relationship between ownership and performance. Thus, the evidence of the effect of inside
ownership is mixed. Osward and Jahera (1991) pointed out that a potential factor contributing to these
inconsistent findings could be the different indicators researchers adopted to ownership and performance.
These authors stated that the use of differing terms to describe ownership as a concept and use of various
indices to measure it can contribute to these conflicting results. Equally, there is a lack of consistency among
researchers on which performance measure to use, for example return on assets or total return to investors. 
4. The relevance of the building blocks for tourism firms
There are different reasons why I want to link the tourism industry to the building blocks. Many of the large
tourism companies like hotel chains and airlines are global in scope and at the same time must try to satisfy
local needs. Not all of them have been able to maximise these considerations at the same time. 
Furthermore,  local units of a tourism chain may have great advantages of co-ordinating efforts, for example
booking routines, discount cards for clients, etc. Survey services for corporate level can be regarded as an
asset as it is possible for achieving economics of scale for the chain as such, for example when it comes to
logos and marketing campaigns. Furthermore, corporate level can use social means of control in order to
keep the whole organisation together. While past economic regimes rewarded firms for maintaining strong
organisational hierarchies and strict work rules, the new business regime is increasingly becoming
dependent upon the service employee in the front line. In such an environment “soft” measures of control
can be the only avenue to peruse. 
5. Final comments
Increasingly complex tourism companies need to get both benefits of adaptability and efficiency. Such firms
need further need to be global and local at the same time. Tourism organisations such as large international
chains seem to go long down the road to decentralisation, pushing toward a more federated structure. 
The business federation provides a new logic of how to think about the relationship between local units and
the centre, as well as deciding upon the horisontal relationships among business units. The role of the local
units as front-office in the client contact represents the entrepreneurial heart of the international firm. Even if
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the federation might give some interesting insights, it is not the only path for tourism organisations. Some
firms are retaining high degrees of centralisation as they expand globally, but a leading management thinker
as Handy (1992) would argue that the trend of local autonomy is going in the direction proposed in this
article. 
References 
Alchihian, A.A and H. Demsetz (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American
Economic Review, 62, pp. 777-795. 
Asava, R.G. and R.L. Engwall (1994), Key need areas for integrating the agile enterprise, Bethlehem, PA:
Agility Fort Enterprise Integration Focus Group. 
 
Becker, G. (1964), Human capital . New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Beekun, R.I. (1989). Assessing the effectiveness of sociotechnical interventions: Antidote or fad? Human
Relations, 42, pp. 877-897.
Berle, A.A. and G.C. Means (1932) , The Modern Corporation and Private property. New York: Macmillan. 
Chaganti, R, V. Mahajan and S. Sharma (1985), Corporate Board Size Composition Corporate Failure in the
Retailing Industry, Journal of Management Studies 22 (July): pp. 400-409.
Chakravarthy, B.S. and P. Lorange (1990), Management Systems for Innovation and Productivity, European
Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 47: 2, pp. 203-213. 
Child, J. (1984), Organization: A Guide to Problems and Pratice, Harper&Row Ltd., London.
Cohen, S.G. and G.E. Ledford (1994), The effectiveness of self-managing teams: A quasi-experiment,
Hunan Relations, 47, pp. 13-43.
Cyert, R.M and J.G. March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Davenport, T.H., D. De Long and M.C. Beers (1997), Successful knowledge management projects, Sloan
Management Review, Vol.: 39, Issue 2: Winter, pp. 43-53.
Davidow, W.H. and M.S. Malone (1992), The virtual corporation: Structuring and revitalizing the corporation
for the 21st century, New York: Harper-Collins.
Friedson, E.(1984). The changing nature of professional control. Annual Review of Sociology, 10: pp. 1-20. 
Garnier, M.C. (1972), Changing recruitment patterns and organizational ideology: The case of a British
Military Academy, Administrative Science Quarterly, 17: pp. 499-507.
Goodman, P.S., E. Ravlin and M. Schinke (1987), Understanding groups in organizations. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 9, pp. 121-173.
Goold, M. and A. Campbell (1987), Strategies and Style, Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 
Coold, M. A. Campbell and A. Alexander (1994), Corporate Level Strategy: Creating Value in the
Multibusiness Company, NY: John Wily and Sons. 
Goold, M. and J.J. Quinn (1990), The Paradox of Strategic Control, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11:1
(Jan.), pp. 34-57. 
Greenwood, R. C.R. Hinings and J. Brown (1990), Merging professional service firms. Organization Science,
5: pp. 239-257. 
Hackman, J.R. (1977), Work design. In J.R. Hackman and J.L. Suttle (Eds), Improving life at work. Santa
Monica, CA: Goodyear (now Scott Foreman, pp. 96-162. 
Carsten M. Syvertsen: Towards the Business Federation in Tourism Firms.
Lillehammer College: Working paper no 91, 1999.
7
Ilintich, A.Y., R.A. D’Aveni and.A.Y Lewin (1996), New organizational forms and strategies for managing in
hypercompetitive environments, Organizational Science, 7, 3:pp. 211-220.
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: pp. 305-360.
Kanter, R.M.(1977), Commitment and Community, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kiggundu, M.N.(1983), Task interdependence and job design: test of a theory. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 31, pp. 145-172.
Kim, W.S., J.W. Lee and J.C. Francis (1988, Investment performance of common stock in relation to insider
ownership, Financial Review, 23, pp. 53-64. 
Kotter, J.P and J. Heskett (1992), Corporate culture and performance:, New York, Free Press. 
Larson, C. and F. Fasto (1989), Teamwork: What must go right/what can go wrong. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
Levine, D.I. and L.D. Tyson (1990). Participation, productivity, and the firm's environment. In A.S. Blinder
(Ed.), Paying for productivity: A look at the evidence, 183-237. Washington, D.C.: Washington.
Levinhagen, M, J. Porac and H. Thomas (1993), Emergent industry leadership and the selling of
technological visions: A social constructions view. In J. Hendry, G. Johnson and J. Newton (eds.), Strategic
thinking: Leadership and the management of change (pp. 69-87). Chichester, England: Wiley. 
Maisifern, C.C. (1997), The firm as a federation, Ph.D. Thesis, Politechnical University of Catelunia, Spain.
Masifern, E. and C.C.Masifern (1997), La Empresa como federacion, In La regeneracion de la empresa,
Carlos Cavalle, Pedro Nueno, Esteban Masifern and Carmen Cristina Maisifern, Biblioteca IESE de gestion
de empresas.
Masifern, E., R. Fraguas and J. Vila (1997). Business Fderation as an Organizational Solution for the 21st
Century Companies: An Application to the Distribution and Retail Sector, Paper presented at the 17th Annual
Conference of Strategic Management Society,
Barcelona, Spain.
Moncoulides, G.A. and R.H. Heck (1993), Organization culture and performance, Organizational Science,
4(2), pp. 209-235.
Mehran, H (1992), Executive Incentive Plans. Corporate Control and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 27, pp. 539-560.
Molz, R. (1988), Managerial Domination of Board of Directors and Financial Performance, Journal of
Business Research 16 (May): 235-249. 
Morch, R., A. Scheifer and R.W. Visnhny (1988), Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp. 293-315. 
 
Ouchi, W.C. (1980), Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 25: March:
pp. 129-141.
Osward, S.L. and J.S. Jahera, Jr. (1991), The influence of ownership on performance: An empirical study.
Strategic Management Journal, 12(4), pp. 321-326. 
Ostroff, F. and D. Smith (1992), The horizontal organisation, McKinsey  Quarterly, First Quarter, pp. 148-
168.
Pasmore, W.A. and G. Khalsa (1993), The contribution of Eric Trist to the social engagement of social
science, Academy of Management Review, 18, pp. 546-569.
Carsten M. Syvertsen: Towards the Business Federation in Tourism Firms.
Lillehammer College: Working paper no 91, 1999.
8
Pearce, J.L. and E.C. Ravlin (1987), The design and activation of self-regulating work groups, Human
Relations, 40, pp. 751-782.
Pitts, P.A. and D. Chittipeddi (1985), Divisional interdependence: An examination of manufacturing inter
relatedness. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Meeting, San Diego, Cal.
Saavedra, R., P.C. Earley and L. Van Dyne (1993), Complex interdependence in task performing groups,
Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, pp.  61-72.
Simons, R. (1994), How top managers use control systems as leverages of strategically renewal, Strategic
Management Journal, 15(3),  pp. 169-190. 
Snow, C.C., R.E. Miles and H.J. Coleman (1992), Managing 21st Century Netwok Organizations,
Organizational Dynamics, Winter: pp. 5-20.
Starbuck, W.H. (1982), Congealing oil: Inventing ideologies to justifying ideologies, Journal of Management
Studies, 19(1), pp. 3-27. 
Teece, D.J. (1980) , Economies of scale and cope of the enterprise, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 1, pp. 233-247. 
Tsetsekps, G.P. and R.A. De Fusco (1990), Portfolio performance, managerial ownership and the size
effect. Journal of Portfolio Management, 16 (3), pp. 33-39.
Tushman, M.L. and C.A. O’Reilly (1997). Winning though Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading
Organizational Change and Renewal . Harvard Business Press.
Vila, J. and C. Syvertsen (1998), Organisational arrangement in Spanish and Norwegian management
consulting firms, paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Competence-based Management,
Oslo, 18-20 June. 
Wholey, D. (1985), Determinants of firm internal labor markets in large law firms. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 30, pp. 318-335. 
Williamson, O.E. (1975), Markets and hierarchies:Analysis and antitrust implications, New York: The Free
Press. 
Wong, C.S. and M.A. Campion (1991), Development and test of a task level model of motivational job
design. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, pp. 825-844.
